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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the importance of real wage rigidities, in particular through their interaction with price stickiness, 
in a calibrated closed-economy New-Keynesian model with monopolistic competition in goods and labour markets, 
labour and capital as production factors, and staggered nominal price and wage setting. Real wage rigidities result 
from a combination of staggered wage-setting and partial indexation of non-reset wages to past inflation. Blanchard 
and Galí (2007) show real rigidities to introduce a trade-off between stabilising inflation and the welfare-relevant out-
put gap. The present paper complements their findings by showing that the welfare costs of real rigidities can be sub-
stantial compared to nominal frictions. In a typical “tale of the second-best”, we also show that in the presence of real 
wage rigidities, higher price stickiness can be welfare-enhancing. 
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1. Introduction 
The need for DSGE models to feature both nominal and real rigidities in order to be able to fit the data has 
been acknowledged since at least Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003), and Blanchard 
and Galí (2007) showed recently that real rigidities introduce a trade-off between stabilising inflation or the 
welfare-relevant output gap. The welfare consequences of this monetary policy dilemma have not been 
explored, however.1 One interesting question in this regard is whether the magnitude of real rigidities that 
is likely to be encountered in practice entails significant welfare losses, compared with those from typical 
degrees of nominal stickiness. Also, the potential importance of real rigidities for monetary policy raises 
the question of whether and how they interact with nominal frictions in terms of their impact on welfare. 
 This paper addresses these issues through a closed-economy New-Keynesian model with monopo-
listic competition in goods and labour markets, labour and capital as production factors, forward-looking 
agents and staggered nominal price and wage setting. We focus on one major type of real rigidity, namely 
real wage rigidity, which is modelled as resulting from a combination of staggered wage-setting and partial 
indexation of non-reset wages to past inflation. The benchmark calibration of our simple model captures 
most of the key features of quarterly macroeconomic data for the United States. 
Regarding monetary policy, with the exception of the benchmark calibration of the model which 
relies on a simple interest rule, we assume the central bank to implement the optimal Ramsey solution, i.e. 
the optimal commitment strategy for given exogenous shock and economic structure. The optimal com-
mitment achieves the best possible stabilisation result and constitutes the policy loss frontier. This assump-
tion also allows a clearer focus on the welfare losses from various types of real and nominal rigidities and 
the interactions between them. Indeed under the alternative policy framework of simple interest rate rules, 
the policy rule might itself affect the welfare losses from, and the interaction between nominal and real 
rigidities. 
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 The main findings from the paper are two-fold. First, under the technology and price mark-up 
shocks considered here, real wage rigidity implies substantial welfare losses, much larger in fact than those 
from nominal rigidities. Second, for any given degree of real wage rigidity, welfare losses decrease in the 
degree of nominal price rigidity for high but still plausible values of the latter. This is because nominal 
frictions dampen the initial price and wage reactions to exogenous shocks and the magnitude of second-
round effects. The result suggests that stronger price rigidity can be second best under real wage inertia. By 
contrast, reducing real wage inertia is welfare-enhancing whatever the degree of nominal price stickiness. 
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the New-Keynesian framework 
and briefly sketches the notion of optimal Ramsey policy. Section 3 discusses the scenarios to be simulated 
and the parameter calibration. Section 4 presents and discusses the numerical results, while Section 5 per-
forms selected robustness checks. Section 6 summarises the main findings and concludes.             
2. The model          
The analysis builds on a closed-economy DSGE model with monopolistic competition in goods and labour 
markets, labour and capital as production factors, forward-looking agents and staggered nominal price and 
wage setting. In each period, the share of wage contracts that is not re-optimised is partially indexed to past 
inflation as in e.g. Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2010), Gertler et al. (2008) and Smets and Wouters (2003). 
The combination of staggered nominal wage setting and partial wage indexation creates real wage rigidity 
in the labour market. This explicit modelling of real wage rigidity alleviates the use of more ad hoc short-
cuts used in some recent papers, such as e.g. Blanchard and Galí (2007) or Ascari and Merkl (2009). Moti-
vating real wage rigidity is warranted given its crucial role in the welfare analyses carried out in this paper, 
and using a shortcut instead would appear doubtful in this context. Overall, the model is very similar to 
that of Canzoneri et al. (2007), except that ours features both nominal and real wage rigidities and optimal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 An early paper by Gray (1978) explored the desirability of real rigidities under nominal and real shocks. However, 
while Gray (1978) considered a rather ad hoc loss function, we look explicitly at social welfare and perform an exten-
sive welfare analysis of the interactions between real and nominal rigidities. 
 4
monetary policy, rather than only nominal wage rigidities and estimated simple interest rules. The model is 
also similar in spirit, although less complex than Smets and Wouters (2003).  
2.1 Firms 
The economy is home to a continuum of firms indexed by f on a unit interval. Each firm combines the 
capital stock Kf,t-1 that is available at the beginning of each period with the contemporaneous bundle of la-
bour Nf,t (defined in equation (15) below) to produce a firm-specific differentiated good using the Cobb-
Douglas production function: 
(1) 1, , 1 ,t
a
f t f t f tY e K N
α α−
−=  
   
where 0≤α≤1. Total factor productivity is assumed to be equal across firms and subject to technology 
shocks: 
(2) 1
a a
t t ta aρ ν−= +   
Firms choose the cost-minimising combination of factor inputs. The cost-minimising factor mix depends 
on factor prices, i.e. on wages Wt and capital costs Rt, and the marginal factor returns: 
(3) ( )( ), 1 ,/ / 1 /f t f t t tK N W Rα α− = − . 
The steady-state relationship between firm-level output and employment under cost-minimising production 
is: 
( ), ,/ 1 /taf t t t f tY e W R Nαα α= −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . 
The cost-minimising firm’s real marginal cost of producing output is:  
(4) ( )1 1, 1 / 1 /taf t t t tMC e R W Pαα α αα α − −⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ . 
Household preferences for the firm sector’s differentiated output are identical for both consumer and capi-
tal goods and given by the CES aggregate: 
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( ) ( )/ 11 1 /
,0t f t
Y Y df
η ηη η −−⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  
with η>1 being the elasticity of substitution between different output varieties. The demand for an individ-
ual variety f of price Pf,t is: 
(5) ( ), , /f t f t t tY P P Yη−= . 
The price Pt of the composite good, which is also the aggregate price level, follows as: 
( )1/ 11 1
,0t f t
P P df
ηη −−⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ . 
Empirical research has provided ample evidence for the practical relevance of nominal price stickiness 
(e.g. Bils and Klenow 2004). Producers reset prices infrequently in response to new information. Potential 
explanations for sluggish adjustment include adjustment costs and contractual obligations. Following 
Calvo (1983), this paper assumes firms to adopt staggered price setting, i.e. firms set prices in staggered 
contracts of random duration. In any period, each firm re-optimises its price contract with probability 1-γ, 
and maintains the old price with probability γ. 
Infrequent contract adjustment makes price setting a dynamic optimisation problem. The re-optimising 
firm sets the new price Pf,t* to maximise the present value of profits over the expected contract duration: 
(6) ( ) ( )*, , ,0 /it t i t i f t t i f t i f t iiE P P P Y MCγβ λ∞ + + + + += −∑ , 
where β and λt are the households' discount factor and the marginal utility of household wealth defined be-
low in equation (21). Maximising profits (6) subject to the demand function (5) yields: 
(7) ( ) ( ) ( )* 1, ,0 0/ 1 /pt i if t t t i t i f t i t i t t i t i t ii iP e E P MC Y E P Yε η ηη η γβ λ γβ λ∞ ∞++ + + + + + += =⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑  
where we add the variable: 
(8) 1
p p p p
t t tε ρ ε ν−= +  
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as an exogenous price mark-up shock.2 As all producers face identical constraints, the optimal price is 
identical across all firms, so that Pf,t*=Pt*. 
The law of large numbers implies that the share of firms that resets price contracts in a given period equals 
the probability of price adjustment 1-γ, whereas γ indicates the degree of nominal price stickiness. The dy-
namics of the aggregate price level follows as: 
(9) ( )( ) ( )1/ 111 *1 1t t tP P P ηηηγ γ −−−−⎡ ⎤= + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 
Combining firm-level production (1) and the demand function (5) gives aggregate output: 
(10) ( )1 1, 10 / tat f t t t tY P P df e K Nη α α− −−=∫  
where 
1
1 , 10t f t
K K df− −= ∫  is the aggregate available capital stock and 1 ,0t f tN N df= ∫  is total employment. 
The expression ( )1 ,0 /Pt f t tD P P dfη−≡ ∫  in equation (10) measures the dispersion of prices across firms. 
Canzoneri et al. (2007) show that this price dispersion evolves as: 
(11) ( )( ) ( ), 1 11 / /P Pt f t t t t tD P P P P Dη ηγ γ− −− −= − + . 
Price dispersion between goods leads to inefficient household choices. Relative demand in the flexible 
economy depends on the utility of variety f and the resource costs of its production, which here are both 
assumed to be identical across all varieties. The marginal utility of consuming variety f is decreasing with 
the level of its consumption. Price stickiness, i.e. γ>0, that implies different prices for goods with identical 
utility and resource costs distorts the demand decisions made by optimising households. 
                                                     
2 Monopolistic competition implies an inefficiently low production level as prices are set with a mark-up above the 
marginal production costs. The size of the distortion varies inversely with the elasticity of substitution η and is there-
fore a positive function of market power. Many models introduce a production or employment subsidy financed by 
lump-sum taxes to correct the steady-state distortion, so that steady-state production would equal the efficient output 
under perfect competition. Because such corrective subsidy financed by non-distortionary taxes has little practical 
relevance, we follow Benigno and Woodford (2005) and do not consider it throughout this paper. 
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2.2 Households 
The economy is populated by a continuum of households indexed by h on a unit interval. Households con-
sume goods Ch,t, invest in capital goods Ih,t and lend them to firms, and supply a differentiated labour ser-
vice Nh,t to all firms. Each individual household maximises welfare, which is the discounted stream of ex-
pected period utility over an infinite planning horizon: 
(12) ( ) ( ) 1, , ,ln / 1it h t i h t i h t ii tE C H N ϕβ κ ϕ∞ ++ + += ⎡ ⎤− − +⎣ ⎦∑ . 
The variable , 1t h tH Cχ −≡ allows for habit persistence in the level of consumption when 0<χ≤1. Such habit 
persistence is ignored in our benchmark calibrated model (i.e. χ=0, see Section 3 below), but it is consid-
ered in Section 5 among a range of robustness checks for our main results. Parameters κ and φ indicate the 
relative weight of leisure in the utility function and the inverse of the elasticity of labour supply, respec-
tively. 
Household h faces the nominal period budget constraint: 
(13) ( ) ( ), , , , , 1 , , , , 1 / 1h t h t h t h t h t h t t h t h t h t tW N B R K D P C I B i− ++ + + = + + + . 
The income side features the wage Wh,t paid by firms for the labour service Nh,t, the return Bh,t on a safe 
asset in zero net supply, the return Rh,t on capital Kh,t-1 lent to firms, and firm profits that are distributed as 
dividends Dh,t. The expenditure side combines the purchases of the composite consumption and capital 
goods and purchases of the safe asset that pays a return of Bh,t+1 in the subsequent period. The current price 
of the safe asset is Bh,t+1/(1+ it), where it is the nominal interest rate. 
The capital stock is subject to depreciation at rate δ and quadratic adjustment costs ψ, and evolves as: 
(14) ( ) ( )2, , 1 , , , 1 , 11 / 2 /h t h t h t h t h t h tK K I I K Kδ ψ δ− − −= − + − − . 
The aggregate labour service N is a CES aggregate of the individual households' labour services: 
(15) ( )
( )/ 11 1 /
,0t h t
N N dh
θ θθ θ −−⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  
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with θ>1 as the elasticity of substitution between the labour services h. The demand for the individual la-
bour service h given its price Wh,t is: 
(16) ( ), , /h t h t t tN W W Nθ−= . 
The price of the composite labour service, which is the aggregate wage, follows as: 
( )1/ 11 1
,0t h t
W W dh
θθ −−⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ . 
Similarly to Calvo pricing, households set wages in staggered wage contracts with a re-optimisation prob-
ability of 1-ω in each period; ω is the probability that the old contract remains in effect. Those wages that 
are not re-optimised in a given period, i.e. the surviving wage contracts, are indexed to past inflation with 
the indexation scheme: 
(17) ( )1 2/t t tx P P σ− −≡ .  
where parameter 0<σ<1 indicates the strength of indexation. This modelling of wage indexation is similar 
to e.g. Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2010), Gertler et al. (2008) and Smets and Wouters (2003). The indexa-
tion of surviving wage contracts to inflation is a source of real wage rigidity, which for a given σ is 
stronger the higher the probability ω that the old contract remains in effect. 
Infrequent contract adjustment makes wage setting a dynamic optimisation problem. The re-optimising 
household sets the new wage Wh,t* to minimise the disutility of work over the expected contract duration 
and given the marginal utility of labour income and the labour demand function of firms. Taking the first-
order condition for Wh,t* from maximising individual welfare (12) under the constraints (13) and (16) and 
the indexation scheme (17), and rearranging the expression yields: 
(18) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1
0 1*1
1
0 1
/
1
ii
t t i t s t ii s
t ii
t t i t s t i t ii s
E W x N
W
E x W N
θ ϕ ϕ
φϕ
θ θ
ωβθκ θ ωβ λ
+∞ +
+ + += =+
−∞
+ + + += =
= −
∑ ∏
∑ ∏
. 
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With all households facing an identical utility function and identical constraints, the optimal wage is iden-
tical across all households, i.e. Wh,t*=Wt*.3 
The law of large numbers implies that the share of re-optimising households in a given period equals the 
probability of wage re-optimisation 1-ω, whereas a share ω of household indexes (partially or fully) past 
wages to past inflation. The aggregate wage level evolves as: 
(19) ( ) ( ) ( )1/ 11 *11 1t t t tW x W W θθ θω ω −− −−⎡ ⎤= + −⎣ ⎦ . 
Wage stickiness, i.e. ω>0, implies that wages are not identical across all households h if the economy is 
away from its steady state. Given the demand function (16), labour demand of firms and work effort will 
differ across households. The opportunity for households to insure against idiosyncratic labour and capital 
income risks in a complete contingent claims market makes households identical in terms of the consump-
tion and investment decisions, however. The households' first-order conditions for consumption and in-
vestment from maximising welfare (12) under the budget constraint (13) and the law of motion of the capi-
tal stock (14) can therefore be aggregated to: 
(20) ( ) ( )1 11/ /t t t t t t tP C C E C Cλ χ βχ χ− += − − −  
(21) ( ) 11t t t ti Eλ β λ += +  
(22) ( )1/t t t t t tP I Kλ ξ ξψ δ−= − −  
(23) ( ) ( )( )21 1 1 1 1 11 / 2 / / /t t t t t t t t t t tE R I K I K I Kξ β λ ξ δ ψ δ ψ δ+ + + + + +⎡ ⎤= + − − − + −⎣ ⎦ . 
Market clearing for productive capital implies and requires 
1 1
, ,0 0h t f t
K dh K df=∫ ∫ , market clearing for la-
bour services 
1 1
, ,0 0h t f t
N dh N df=∫ ∫  and market clearing for total output t t tY C I= + . 
                                                     
3 The wage mark-up under monopolistic competition implies lower equilibrium employment than in the undistorted 
economy as the real wage lies above the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. The size of 
the distortion varies inversely with the elasticity of substitution θ and is therefore a positive function of the market 
power. As for the price mark-up in equation (7), we exclude a corrective wage subsidy financed by non-distortionary 
taxes as an unrealistic scheme. 
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2.3 Monetary policy 
The paper investigates the stabilising potential of optimal Ramsey policy as the optimal commitment solu-
tion for alternative combinations of nominal price and real wage rigidity. The monetary authority maxi-
mises conditional expected social welfare subject to the household and firm sectors' behavioural equations 
and the market-clearing conditions of the economy that constitute the policy maker's constraints (Khan et 
al., 2003; Levin et al., 2006). The policy maker's first-order conditions replace standard instrument rules in 
this setup. 
Following Canzoneri et al. (2007), we define social welfare as: 
(24) ( ) ( ) 1 1,0ln / 1it t i t i h t ii tE C H N dhϕβ κ ϕ∞ ++ + += ⎡ ⎤− − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∫ , 
with ( )1 , , , ,0t t h t h t h t h tC H C H dh C H− = − = −∫  being average consumption adjusted for consumption hab-
its and ( ) 1 1,0/ 1 h tN dhϕκ ϕ +− + ∫  being the average disutility of work (note again that consumption habits are 
ignored in our benchmark specification but are considered as part of a sensitivity analysis in Section 5). 
If wages are flexible, i.e. ω=0, then Wh,t=Wt, so that given the labour demand equation (14) firms hire the 
same amount of labour services from each household and the average equals the individual disutility of 
work
1 1 1
, ,0 h t h t
N dh Nϕ ϕ+ +=∫ . In this special case of identical demand for all labour services h, social welfare 
(24) boils down to the individual welfare function (12). If wages are sticky, i.e. ω>0, and the economy is 
outside its steady state, wage dispersion makes firms hire different amounts of labour services from differ-
ent households. Given the increasing marginal disutility of working effort in equation (12) and the decreas-
ing marginal contribution of labour services h in the composite labour service, the disutility will not be 
minimised and the composite labour service not be maximised for the given and dispersed aggregate labour 
input 
1
,0 h t
N dh∫ . Canzoneri et al. (2007) show the average disutility of labour effort to be: 
(25) ( ) ( )1 1 11 1, ,0 0 /h t t h t tN dh N W W dhθ ϕϕ ϕ − ++ +=∫ ∫  
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The evolution of wage dispersion ( ) ( )1 1,0 /Wt h t tD W W dhθ ϕ− +≡ ∫  with staggered wage setting and wage in-
dexation follows as:  
(26) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1* 1 11 / /W Wt t t t t t tD W W x W W Dθ ϕ θ ϕω ω− + − +− −= − + . 
The Ramsey optimal policy implements the best stabilisation outcome for a given economic structure and 
given exogenous shocks. Simulating the shocks under optimal policy yields the loss frontier, i.e. the small-
est possible welfare loss, for alternative values of nominal and real rigidity. The optimal commitment solu-
tion therefore constitutes an important benchmark to assess the welfare costs and policy implications of 
nominal and real rigidities. We use the algorithm of Levin et al. (2006) to derive the optimal commitment 
solution in Dynare. In order to check robustness of the interaction results, we also briefly assess the welfare 
loss under a simple interest rate rule that may provide a better approximation to the actual conduct of 
monetary policy, and also look at alternative model specifications without capital adjustment costs and/or 
with habit persistence in consumption.       
3. Simulation scenarios and benchmark calibration         
This paper studies the welfare costs from, and the interactions between nominal price and real wage rigidi-
ties under optimal monetary commitment, i.e. under the optimal stabilisation of the exogenous shock given 
the structural frictions and inefficiencies. We perform this welfare analysis by varying the wage and price 
rigidity parameters of our model around their benchmark values. The calculation of first and second mo-
ments of the variables and the welfare comparison are all based on first-order and second-order approxima-
tions of the model undertaken in Dynare 4. 
 Table 1 specifies the parameters used in our benchmark calibration. The structure of our model is 
very similar to that of Canzoneri et al. (2007), whose parameter values were shown to match most vari-
ances and covariances in U.S quarterly macroeconomic data. Therefore we use their parameter values, 
which, looking at the literature, also turn out to be fairly consensual values. One exception is the wage in-
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dexation parameter, which is specific to our model and the main source – in combination with nominal 
wage stickiness – of real wage rigidity. We set this parameter equal to 0.7, which corresponds roughly to 
the average of estimates for the United States across the papers by Gertler et al. (2008), Smets and Wouters 
(2003), Sahuc and Smets (2008) and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2010).4 Since we explore optimal mone-
tary policy, we do not need to calibrate a monetary policy rule, unlike Canzoneri et al. (2007). However, 
insofar as the simple monetary policy rule estimated and used in Canzoneri et al. (2007) influenced the 
choice of their other model parameters, the calibration of our own model implicitly relies on that simple 
monetary policy rule – as should be the case for the model to match key features of U.S. data.   
 Our welfare analysis focuses essentially on productivity shocks, although we illustrate the general-
ity of our findings by considering price mark-up shocks in some simulation exercises.  The standard devia-
tion of productivity shocks and the persistence parameter are set equal to 0.01 and 0.9, respectively, close 
to the average values considered in Canzoneri et al. (2007). While these parameter choices matter for the 
benchmark calibration of the model, they do not make a major difference for our subsequent welfare analy-
sis, which focuses on the relative costs of real and nominal rigidities and how they interact. Similar persis-
tence and volatility parameters are used for illustrative purposes in the price mark-up shock simulations. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
 Since our model differs slightly from that of Canzoneri et al. (2007) in that it features wage in-
dexation and does not distinguish between private and public consumption, using their parameter values 
does not strictly guarantee that our benchmark calibration matches key moments in the data. Therefore in 
Table 2 we check whether our calibrated model is indeed able to capture key volatilities, correlations and 
auto-correlations in quarterly U.S macroeconomic data. For the sake of consistency, the analysis is based 
                                                     
4 We do the same for the choice of the consumption habit persistence coefficient in the robustness checks performed 
in Section 5 below. However, that coefficient is set equal to zero in the benchmark model and the welfare analysis of 
Section 4, consistent with a calibration strategy based on parameter values used in Canzoneri et al. (2007) who ignore 
habit persistence.  
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on both the technology shocks as calibrated above and on the monetary policy rate shocks considered in 
Canzoneri et al. (2007).5 The model’s variables are expressed as log deviations from a deterministic steady 
state, and moments are calculated from a linear approximation. Both the model data and the actual data are 
in logarithms and Hodrick-Prescott filtered with parameter λ=1600. Our simple model comes fairly close 
to matching the volatility of output in U.S historical data, as well as the volatilities and correlations with 
output of consumption, investment and employment.6 The model also captures the negative correlation be-
tween inflation and output, but it tends to overstate its strength and to understate inflation volatility relative 
to the volatility of output. The same holds for real wages, which tend to be more volatile and less strongly 
correlated with output than the model predicts. This limited match for real wages is similar to the calibra-
tion results in Canzoneri et al. (2007). The limited match for real wages seems to be due primarily to the 
omission in this extremely simple model of a whole range of shocks that reduce the correlation between 
real wages and output.7 The limited match is not indicative for an overemphasis on wage indexation and 
stickiness in the model. Using survey data, Barattieri et al. (2010) estimate wage indexation and contract 
duration parameters that are similar in size to those of Table 1. The time-varying estimates by Fernández-
Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007) suggest that the indexation parameter has even increased to higher 
values in recent decades. Varying the wage indexation and Calvo wage stickiness parameters within plau-
sible parameter ranges does furthermore not significantly affect the correlation between real wages and 
output under the given set of exogenous shocks in Table 2. 
 
                                                     
5 Canzoneri et al. (2007) also consider government spending shocks, which are ignored here as we do not distinguish 
between private and public consumption. Making this distinction would be straightforward, but it was not found to be 
crucial in practice in the context of this paper since our simple calibrated model is able to capture most of the key 
features of U.S. quarterly macroeconomic data reasonably well. 
6 The high correlation in the model between consumption and output is linked to the closed-economy framework in 
which domestic demand and output evolve in line in each period, a constraint that does not exist in the actual data.  
7 Candidate shocks include fiscal policy. However, the degree to which fiscal shocks improve the match depends on 
the degree of substitutability between private and public expenditure, which is difficult to calibrate. Canzoneri et al. 
(2007) assume purely wasteful government spending. Increases in wasteful spending reduce household wealth, which 
leads to a positive response of labour supply. The effect reduces the positive correlation between output and real 
wages and improves the fit with actual data in their model. 
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[Table 2 here] 
 
4. Results         
We now analyse the effects of real wage rigidity and its interaction with price stickiness within the 
calibrated model under technology shocks and optimal monetary policy commitment. We start by looking 
at the behaviour of the economy for a few selected degrees of nominal and real rigidities before turning to 
welfare analysis and generalising the results. Table 3 reports the first and second moments for log output, 
the output gap,8 inflation and the nominal interest rate for three combinations of nominal and real rigidities: 
i) the benchmark values of nominal price stickiness, nominal wage stickiness and wage indexation; ii) a 
lower degree of wage indexation, corresponding to lower real wage rigidity, iii) a higher degree of price 
stickiness.9  
 
 [Table 3 here] 
 
Comparing weaker wage indexation with the benchmark calibration, the volatility of log output, 
the output gap, inflation and the nominal interest rate are found to be lower under weaker wage indexation 
and thereby under lower real wage rigidity. By contrast, volatilities appear to be lower when price sticki-
ness is higher. The impulse responses in Figure 1 further illustrate the findings from Table 3 on macroeco-
nomic volatility under different degrees of nominal and real rigidities. This chart plots log output, the out-
put gap, inflation and the nominal interest rate, but also the real interest rates, log consumption, log in-
vestment, log employment and the log real wage, in deviations from steady-state levels. Compared with the 
                                                     
8 Blanchard and Galí (2007) refer to this variable as the welfare-relevant output gap. It measures the log difference 
between actual output and production under fully flexible prices and wages. Thus, the latter measure of potential pro-
duction displays the optimal unconstrained behaviour of household and firms in reaction to the exogenous shock.     
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benchmark calibration, more flexible real wages mitigate the response of inflation and the output gap and 
speed up the adjustment to a technology shock. Likewise, stronger price inertia dampens the amplitude of 
the inflation and output gap responses. 
 Table 3 and Figure 1 suggest an important role for the nominal-real rigidity interaction in shaping 
the interest rate, inflation and output gap responses to technology shocks, and to macroeconomic shocks 
more broadly. Instead of reinforcing the effect of real wage persistence, sticky prices dampen the inflation 
and output response to shocks, for a given level of real rigidity. Flexible prices amplify the initial inflation 
response to the negative technology shock considered in Figure 1. In a context where real wages respond 
little to the decline in output and labour demand, higher initial inflation pushes up the nominal wage, 
thereby reinforcing inflationary pressures. The monetary authority concerned about inflation and the asso-
ciated inefficiency reacts more strongly and engineers a larger output contraction. By contrast, higher 
nominal price rigidity dampens initial inflationary pressures and improves both inflation and output stabili-
sation, for a given degree of real rigidity. In other words, when real wage rigidities are present in the econ-
omy, price stickiness dampens the initial goods price response to negative technology shocks and mitigates 
the second-round effect from nominal wages on production costs. A symmetric line of reasoning holds for 
positive technology shocks.  
 
[Figures 1 here] 
 
 Turning now to welfare analysis, Figure 2 plots the welfare loss relative to the fully flexible econ-
omy (expressed as a percentage of steady-state consumption) across the parameter space γ=0.1-0.9 and 
σ=0-1, i.e. for a broad range of degrees of price stickiness and real wage rigidity, with grid intervals of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 Standard deviations in Table 3 are Hodrick-Prescott filtered with parameter λ=1600. Considering raw standard de-
viations would yield larger values, but it would not change the ranking of standard deviations across different combi-
nations of rigidity parameters, which is the main focus of Table 3. 
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0.1.10 Two main findings stand out. First, regardless of the degree of price stickiness, the loss strongly in-
creases in the degree of real wage rigidity. Second and most interestingly, for high but still plausible de-
grees of real wage rigidity (including the benchmark value), higher price stickiness reduces the welfare 
loss, reflecting the aforementioned interaction. In other words, stronger nominal rigidity can be second best 
in the presence of real rigidities.  
 
[Figures 2 here] 
 
Another important conclusion from Figure 2 is that the welfare cost of real wage rigidity is signifi-
cantly larger than that from price stickiness. This can further be seen in Figure 3, which looks at the wel-
fare costs of extreme values of real wage rigidity by iterating on both the nominal wage persistence and 
wage indexation parameters. Figure 3 shows that when price stickiness is at its benchmark value, extreme 
values of both wage persistence and wage indexation parameters – corresponding to extreme values of real 
wage rigidity – can yield welfare losses as high as ½ % of steady-state consumption relative to a fully 
flexible economy. This is much higher than the welfare losses from strong price stickiness in Figure 2. For 
instance, when the nominal wage persistence and wage indexation parameters – and thereby the degree of 
real rigidity – are set equal to their benchmark values (ω = 0.75 and σ = 0.7), the welfare losses from ex-
treme values of price stickiness never exceed 0.1% to 0.15% of steady-state consumption. 
 
[Figures 3 here] 
 
                                                     
10 The nominal wage stickiness parameter ω is set constant and equal to its benchmark value across all the simula-
tions run to produce Figure 2. Since real wage rigidity in our model results from a combination of nominal wage 
stickiness and wage indexation, we can vary the degree of real wage rigidity by varying either nominal wage sticki-
ness or wage indexation relative to their benchmark values (or both). Figure 2 is based on the latter approach, but the 
former – not shown here – brings qualitatively similar results.   
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5. Robustness checks         
We illustrate the robustness of our main results by performing three simple sensitivity exercises in 
which alternative shocks, model specifications and monetary policy assumptions are considered. First, per-
forming the welfare analysis for price mark-up rather than technology shocks yields comparable relative 
losses from, and a similar interaction between nominal and real rigidities (Figure 4).11 Second, considering 
a model without capital adjustment costs, i.e. a model without any real friction other than real wage rigid-
ity, does not significantly alter the shape of the welfare loss surface either (Figure 5). Likewise, a version 
of the model featuring habit persistence in consumption yields similar results (Figure 6). Finally, our main 
findings are robust to, and are in fact even strengthened under an alternative monetary policy assumption 
where the central bank implements a simple rule rather than optimal policy. Under the simple interest rate 
rule estimated by Canzoneri et al. (2007) on U.S. data, which was mentioned in Section 3, the relative wel-
fare costs of real and nominal rigidities are roughly unchanged, while greater price stickiness is now al-
ways welfare-enhancing for any given degree of real wage rigidity (Figure 7). Incidentally, a comparison 
between Figures 7 and 2 also illustrates the gains from optimal monetary policy, which typically halves the 
magnitude of welfare losses compared to the simple rule. 
 
[Figures 4-7 here] 
 
                                                     
11 The calibration of these price mark-up shocks is illustrative. Their standard deviation and persistence parameter are 
set equal to 0.01 and 0.9, respectively, similar to the values used for technology shocks. It is worth noting that further 
sensitivity analysis not reported here shows that the shape of the interaction between price stickiness and real wage 
rigidity would be comparable under wage mark-up rather than price mark-up shocks. The wage mark-up shock enters 
equation (18) analogously to the price mark-up shock in equation (7) and is specified as AR(1) process analogously to  
the price mark-up shock in equation (8).  
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6. Conclusion        
This paper explores the welfare effects of real wage rigidities and their interaction with price 
stickiness, two issues which somewhat surprisingly have surfaced only recently in the New-Keynesian lit-
erature. To this end, we rely on a small DSGE model where real wage rigidity results from a combination 
of staged nominal wage setting and indexation of non-reset wages to past inflation. The benchmark calibra-
tion of our simple model captures the main features of U.S. macroeconomic data. Impulse responses to 
technology shocks are presented, and welfare analysis is undertaken, for a broad range of degrees of price 
stickiness and real wage rigidity. We find that the welfare cost of real wage rigidities is significantly larger 
than that from price stickiness. Most interestingly, in a typical “tale of the second best”, greater price 
stickiness can be welfare-enhancing in the presence of real wage rigidities, as it dampens the initial price 
response and thereby weakens wage indexation mechanisms. These results are shown to be robust to alter-
native model specifications, shocks and monetary policy assumptions. 
From a theoretical perspective, these findings confirm Blanchard and Galí (2007) and suggest that 
monetary economists should pay greater attention to real wage rigidities than has been the case in the re-
cent past. From a policy perspective, it appears that in the presence of real wage rigidities, reducing price 
stickiness is not necessarily welfare-enhancing. It is therefore not straightforward that greater product mar-
ket competition, which is often advocated by central bankers especially in continental Europe, would actu-
ally help the conduct of monetary policy unless real wage rigidities are addressed first through labour mar-
ket reforms.   
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Parameter Symbol Value 
Discount factor β 0.99 
Elasticity of labour supply φ-¹ 0.33 
Coefficient for disutility of work κ 1.00 
Calvo price stickiness γ 0.67 
Calvo wage stickiness ω 0.75 
Wage indexation σ 0.70 
Elasticity of substitution between goods varieties η 7.00 
Elasticity of substitution between labour varieties θ 7.00 
Input share of capital α 0.25 
Capital adjustment costs ψ 8.00 
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025 
Shock persistence ρ 0.90 
Standard deviation of innovations stdev (ν) 0.01 
Table 1: Parameters for the benchmark calibration  
 
 Baseline calibration Actual data 
Variable Correlation with output Standard deviation Correlation with output Standard deviation 
Output 1.000 0.023 1.000 0.017 
Consumption 0.998 0.693 0.829 0.628 
Investment 0.996 2.716 0.951 2.766 
Hours worked 0.873 0.773 0.884 0.847 
Real wage 0.721 0.267 0.380 0.469 
Inflation -0.548 0.156 -0.479 0.225 
Notes: All variables except inflation are in real terms. The standard deviation for output is the true standard deviation; for all other variables it is 
the standard deviation relative to the standard deviation of output. Actual data are U.S. quarterly data for 1971q1-2000q4. The actual data for hours 
worked and real wages refer to the non-farm sector; their correlation with output and standard deviation relate to non-farm output. Actual inflation 
is the quarterly percentage change of the GDP deflator. Non-farm wages are deflated by the deflator for non-farm GDP. 
Table 2: Comparison between the benchmark calibration of the model and actual quarterly data from the U.S. 
economy 
 
Rigidity parameters Standard deviations 
Calvo price parameter Wage indexation Output Output gap Inflation Nominal interest rate 
0.67 0.70 0.0145 0.0012 0.0045 0.0038 
0.67 0.40 0.0143 0.0008 0.0037 0.0030 
0.90 0.70 0.0126 0.0010 0.0008 0.0015 
Table 3: Standard deviations for selected combinations of nominal and real rigidities  
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to the technology shock under selected degrees of nominal and real rigidities 
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Figure 2: Welfare losses from technology shocks across a grid of price stickiness and real wage rigidity values 
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Figure 3: Welfare losses from technology shocks across a grid of nominal wage persistence and wage indexa-
tion parameter values 
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Figure 4: Welfare losses from price mark-up shocks across a grid of price stickiness and real wage rigidity val-
ues 
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Figure 5: Welfare losses from technology shocks across a grid of price stickiness and real wage rigidity values 
in a model specification without capital adjustment costs (ψ = 0) 
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Figure 6: Welfare losses from technology shocks across a grid of price stickiness and real wage rigidity values 
in a model specification with habit persistence in consumption (χ = 0.7) 
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Figure 7: Welfare losses from technology shocks across a grid of price stickiness and real wage rigidity values 
under a simple interest rule instead of optimal monetary policy 
 
